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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 19-1446 
___________ 
 
REGINALDO COLINO, 
 
    Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
 
                Respondent 
 
____________________________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A216-407-722 ) 
Immigration Judge: Irma Lopez Defillo 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
July 3, 2019 
Before:  MCKEE, COWEN, and RENDELL, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: July 9, 2019) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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PER CURIAM 
 Reginaldo Colino, a native and citizen of Brazil, petitions for review of the Board 
of Immigration Appeals’ decision denying his motion to reopen, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).  
For the reasons that follow, we will deny the petition for review. 
 Colino entered the United States on December 1, 1998 with permission to stay 
until May 31, 1999.   On January 5, 2018, the Department of Homeland Security charged 
him with removability under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(B) for overstaying his visitor’s visa.  
Colino, through counsel, admitted his removability in Immigration Court.  The 
Immigration Judge granted Colino and his counsel two continuances to submit any 
applications for relief from removal. 
At Colino’s removal hearing on May 23, 2018, the IJ asked Colino’s counsel what 
relief from removal Colino would be seeking.  Colino’s counsel stated that Colino did not 
have any applications for relief from removal, and that any form of relief would be based 
on his cooperation with law enforcement in a pending criminal case.  Colino’s counsel 
asked the IJ for an additional continuance.  The IJ declined to grant any further 
continuances and noted that, if the Government needed Colino to remain in the United 
States to assist in a criminal prosecution, the Department of Homeland Security could 
stay his removal or facilitate an application on his behalf for an S-visa.1  In any event, the 
                                              
1 An S-visa is a temporary visa that allows a cooperating witness to remain in the United 
States for three years.  Doe v. Holder, 763 F.3d 251, 253 n.2 (2d Cir. 2014) (citing 8 
U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(15)(S)).  A law enforcement agency applies for the S-visa on behalf of 
a cooperating witness.  Id. (citing 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(t)). 
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IJ concluded, Colino’s stated cooperation with law enforcement did not render him 
eligible for relief from removal.  The IJ stated that Colino did not appear to be eligible for 
cancellation of removal because he had no qualifying relatives or eligible for withholding 
of removal because he did not fear harm upon his return to Brazil, to which Colino’s 
counsel responded, “That’s correct, your honor.”  The IJ told Colino that she did not 
“foresee any other potential relief” for which he would “qualify for before the court.”  
The IJ asked Colino’s counsel if he could “enlighten [her] that there’s something that [she 
was] not seeing.”  Colino’s counsel responded, “I can’t, your honor.”  After counsel 
indicated that Colino would not be seeking voluntary departure, the IJ asked Colino’s 
counsel, “So [he] wants an order of removal?”  As Colino’s counsel responded that 
“[t]hat appears to be” the case, Colino interjected, “That’s fine, your honor.” 
At the conclusion of the removal hearing, the IJ issued a form decision ordering 
Colino removed to Brazil.  On the second page of the form, the IJ checked a box showing 
that both parties waived appeal.  Colino, acting pro se, appealed to the Board of 
Immigration Appeals, contending that the IJ did not fully consider all of his options for 
relief.  On July 30, 2018, the Board remanded Colino’s case because there was no oral or 
written decision from the removal hearing.  On remand, the IJ issued another form 
decision, writing by hand that she issued a “summary written decision” because Colino 
“did not seek relief before the court.”  The IJ also wrote that the “appeal was waived.”  
Colino again appealed to the Board. 
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On September 20, 2018, the Board dismissed Colino’s appeal.  The Board noted 
that Colino had waived an appeal and had not argued that his decision to waive his appeal 
was not a knowing and intelligent one.  The Board concluded that the IJ’s decision 
therefore became administratively final upon Colino’s waiver of that right, citing, in 
pertinent part, 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.3(a)(1), 1003.39. 
On December 17, 2018, Colino filed a motion to reopen removal proceedings with 
the Board, arguing that, on May 23, 2018, the IJ conducted both a removal hearing and a 
bond determination.  Colino claimed that he asked his attorney to reserve his right to 
appeal the removal order and waive his appeal of the bond determination.  Colino argued 
that the failure to reserve his right to appeal was the result of confusion between his 
attorney and the IJ, and/or, in the alternative, confusion between him and his attorney, 
and thus his waiver was not knowing and intelligent.  He argued a violation of his due 
process rights in connection with the loss of his appeal to the Board on the ground that it 
was “irrational” to waive an appeal of a removal order but reserve an appeal of the denial 
of a bond determination. 
On February 18, 2019, the Board denied Colino’s motion to reopen.  In rejecting 
his arguments as meritless, the Board reasoned that Colino had appeared in Immigration 
Court with counsel, had stated that he was not eligible for any form of relief within the 
IJ’s authority to grant, and, after waiving any right he might have had to voluntary 
departure, had consented to the issuance of an order or removal.  The Board further held 
that, to the extent that Colino blamed his attorney for waiving his appeal rights, he had 
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not complied with the requirements set forth in Matter of Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. 637 
(BIA 1988), or explained why he could not do so. 
Colino timely petitions for review of the Board’s order denying his motion to 
reopen.  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1), (b)(1).2  We review the 
Board’s denial of a motion to reopen for an abuse of discretion.  See Contreras v. Att’y 
Gen. of U.S., 665 F.3d 578, 583 (3d Cir. 2012).  Accordingly, we may reverse the 
Board’s decision “only if the denial is arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law.”  Id. (citing 
Shardar v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 503 F.3d 308, 311-12 (3d Cir. 2007)).  In his Informal 
Brief, Colino argues that the Board erred in not addressing his ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim on the merits, and that counsel’s failure to preserve his right to appeal to 
the Board violated his constitutional right to due process.  Petitioner’s Informal Brief, at 
2, 4, 6.3 
To make a due process claim under the Fifth Amendment, the alien must show 
that he was prevented from reasonably presenting his case, and that substantial prejudice 
resulted.  See Fadiga v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 488 F.3d 142, 155 (3d Cir. 2007).4  A Fifth 
                                              
2 We previously denied Colino’s motion for a stay of removal. 
   
3 Colino does not argue, as he did before the Board, that his waiver of an appeal was not a 
knowing and intelligent one.  Accordingly, this issue is waived.  See Chen v. Ashcroft, 
381 F.3d 221, 235 (3d Cir. 2004). 
 
4  The Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel does not apply, 
because immigration proceedings are civil rather than criminal in nature.  Id. at 155, 157 
& n.23. 
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Amendment due process claim based on an allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel 
during removal proceedings must meet certain procedural requirements.  See Lu v. 
Ashcroft, 259 F.3d 127, 132 (3d Cir. 2001).  The petitioner must (1) support the claim 
with an affidavit “that sets forth in detail the agreement that was entered into with former 
counsel with respect to the actions to be taken on appeal and what counsel did or did not 
represent to the petitioner in this regard;” (2) inform former counsel of the allegations and 
provide counsel with the opportunity to respond, and this response should be submitted 
with the motion alleging ineffective assistance, and (3) state “whether a complaint has 
been filed with appropriate disciplinary authorities regarding such representation, and if 
not, why not.  Id. (quoting Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 638).  Strict compliance with the 
requirements may be excused where the petitioner provides a reasonable explanation for 
his failure to comply, Lu, 259 F.3d at 134.   
In Colino’s case, he plainly failed to comply with any of the Lozada procedural 
requirements for raising an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.  Moreover, the Board 
reasonably concluded that his lack of an explanation for this failure was a proper basis for 
denying the motion to reopen.  In particular, Colino provided no evidence showing that 
he contacted his former counsel, advised former counsel of the allegation of 
ineffectiveness, or provided former counsel with an opportunity to respond.  Colino’s 
failure to notify former counsel of the alleged ineffectiveness and provide him an 
opportunity to respond is especially significant in view of his contention that it was 
“irrational” for counsel to have waived an appeal of the removal order and instead have 
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reserved an appeal of a bond denial.  Moreover, although Colino argued in his motion to 
reopen that he told former counsel to reserve an appeal, he did not, as required under 
Lozada, make this claim in an affidavit.  Colino also did not provide evidence showing 
that he filed a bar complaint against his former counsel, or provide an explanation for 
why he had not done so.  Accordingly, the Board did not abuse its discretion in denying 
Colino’s motion to reopen, see Contreras, 665 F.3d at 583; Shardar, 503 F.3d at 311-12. 
For the foregoing reasons we will deny the petition for review.   
 
